This paper uses historical U.S. data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation. The evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate U.S. capital formation; only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life-cycle or "hump" savings. A major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age-earnings and age-consumption profiles. These profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life-cycle savings. This paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers. Life-cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers.
alone can explain aggregate U.S. capital formation. We find that lifetime consumption and earnings profiles do not exhibit the kind of shapes needed to generate substantial life-cycle savings. Log linear approximations to these profiles suggest that growth rates of real earnings slightly exceed growth rates of real consumption over the lifetime. Since the life-cycle theory strongly relies on a lifetime growth rate of consumption in excess of the growth rate of earnings, the life-cycle theory of savings with no intergenerational transfers is a very poor description of the process of capital accumulation in the U.S. economy.
Our findings are in agreement with recent studies by White (1978) and Darby (1979) and rationalize other stylized facts about the U.S. economy at odds with the life-cycle theory. Mirer presents evidence from social security data that "the aged do not run down their wealth during their lifetime" (1979, p. 442). Indeed, after he adjusts for intercohort differences in wealth at retirement, Mirer finds "that wealth clearly increases with age" (1979, p. 442). Darby points out that, although the ratio of expected retirement years to expected life span increased by 67 percent from 1890 to 1930, aggregate savings rates showed no increase during this period as would be predicted by the life-cycle theory (1979, pp. 22-28). Atkinson (1971) and Oulton (1976) construct life-cycle models to determine how much of observed British inequality of wealth may be explained by this theory. The answer is, very little. After taking into account inequality in ageearnings profiles and realized rates of return, Oulton concludes, "The results indicate that none of these factors, either singly or in combination, are capable of accounting for a substantial proportion of actual wealth inequality" (1976, p. 99).
Section I presents a theoretical framework for considering the importance of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation. Section II discusses the procedure to estimate the stock of life-cycle wealth. The data are described in Section III. Section IV presents and intuitively motivates the findings. The sensitivity of the findings to reasonable possible errors in the data and estimation procedure is also considered. The fifth section attempts to account for the residual between total U.S. wealth and the stock of life-cycle wealth using the limited information available on actual intergenerational transfers. The sixth and final section of the paper presents the conclusions and discusses some of their implications.
I. Life-Cycle and Transfer Wealth-a Theoretical Framework
The division of the stock of wealth, W, into life-cycle and transfer components, L and T, respectively, is easily understood by consider- 
The W1's equal, by definition, accumulated flows of net received transfers plus accumulated flows of earnings net of government taxes less government transfers less accumulated flows of consumption, where accumulation takes place at the after-tax interest rate r. Let Tk be the net transfer received at age i from individuals age j for individuals who are currently age k. For example, T32 represents the net transfer (which may be positive or negative) that a current 3-periodold individual received at the time he or she was 1 period old from individuals who were then 2 periods old. Let ek and ck represent the earnings and consumption of k-period-old individuals when they were i periods old. Assuming that earnings, consumption, and transfers occur at the end of each period, W1, the wealth of age 1 individuals, equals zero. With this notation, W2 and W3 may be expressed as: W2= (Tl2 + T13)(1 + r) + (el-c)(1 + r) W3 = (T%2 + Tl3)(1 + r)2 + (T21 + T22)(1 + r)
+ (e 3-c3)( 1+ r)2 + (e 3-c3)(I1 + r).
Combining (1) and (2) yields:
where T = (T12 + Equation (3) is the fundamental accounting relationship analyzed in this paper. Transfer wealth, T, corresponds to accumulated net received transfers, while life-cycle wealth, L, corresponds to accumulated earnings less accumulated consumption. Clearly, in a world with no intergenerational transfers, T would equal zero and W would equal L. Our first goal is to establish the relative magnitudes of the two components T and L and thereby determine whether U.S. wealth holdings can be predominantly explained by life-cycle savings. Since substantially less information is available about the values of the Tk, most of this paper is devoted to calculating the value of L. Section V does, however, attempt to estimate T directly using fragmentary data and invoking steady-state assumptions.
If the economy is in a steady state, net intergenerational transfers received at a given age are constant through time, so that: Under the assumption that population grows at a constant rate n, P1 =P3(1 + n)2 and P1 = P2(1 + n).
Since transfers received by age group i from age group j equal the negative of group j's transfers from age group i,
and T12P = -T21P2.
From ( If r exceeds (is less than) n, accumulated transfer wealth will exceed (be less than) the annual flow of transfers times the weighted average age gap. Equations (8) and (9) show that the contribution of transfers to the total stock of wealth depends critically on both the volume of the annual flow of transfers and the age span of transfers. Equation (8) is invoked in Section V to directly estimate the size of T.
The second goal of this paper is to ask the economic question, How would the U.S. capital stock, W, change if, because of changes in taxes or tastes, intergenerational transfer wealth, T, was reduced? Since consumption, leisure, and transfer decisions are jointly determined it is important to examine the possibility that changes in transfers might 711 induce or be associated with changes in consumption and earnings paths and thus alter the life-cycle component of wealth. In addition to recognizing interdependencies between transfer wealth and life-cycle wealth, the effect of changes in transfer behavior on capital formation may be examined in both partial and general equilibrium contexts. The partial equilibrium change in W resulting from a reduction in T holds wage rates and interest rates constant and corresponds to a shift in the household supply curve of capital. This paper considers only the steady-state partial equilibrium impact of changes in transfers on the capital stock. A calculation of the general equilibrium effect requires taking account of the responsiveness of the level and shapes of earnings, consumption, and lifetime transfer profiles to changes in capital accumulation.4
The Steady-State Partial Equilibrium Reduction in Capital Intensity Arising from a Reduction in Intergenerational Transfers
In order to analyze the partial equilibrium reduction in the stock of wealth, we first note that life-cycle wealth, L, equals accumulated earnings minus accumulated consumption. Accumulated earnings, in turn, equals accumulated wages at full-time work minus the accumulated value of leisure. Letting C stand for accumulated consumption, S for accumulated full-time wages, and M for the accumulated value of leisure, equation ( Our analysis of the response terms AM/8 T and a) C/4 T assumes that the utility of consumption and leisure is separable from the utility derived from intergenerational transfers. This assumption implies that the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure at different points in time are independent of the level of intergenerational transfers. Two examples of utility functions exhibiting this property are: UO = log CO + log C1 + log C2 + log 1l + log 12 + log 13 + a log T12 + a log T13 (11) + a log T21 + a log T23 + a log T31 + a log T32 and UO = log CO + log C1 + log C2 + log1 (11') + log 12 + log 13 + a U.
The term UO stands for the utility of a representative individual of generation zero. The terms 4l, 12, and 13 correspond to leisure in different periods. In (I1) the individual derives utility directly from the level of net transfers. In (11') the individual derives utility from the utility, Ul, of his descendants. This is an example of an "overlapping utility function." For both types of separable utility functions the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure are independent of the level of a, the preference parameter influencing the size of transfers. In addition, the first-order conditions for the optimal choice of consumption and leisure involve the equality between these marginal rates of substitution and the relative prices of consumption and leisure at different ages. Hence, neither changes in transfer preferences nor taxes on intergenerational transfers that affect only the price of transfers but not the price of consumption or leisure will alter the first-order conditions. Given the levels of transfers, the utility-maximizing levels of consumption and leisure can be separately derived from these first-order conditions and the lifetime budget constraint given below: We now demonstrate that this income effect of a change in transfers is identically zero for the case that r equals n.6 Using (5) and (6) to rewrite (12), we obtain: (1 + r)3
As is clear from (12') and (12"), when r = n, lifetime consumption and leisure are financed solely out of lifetime full earnings; all of the accrued interest on received transfers, as well as the principle itself, is used to maintain steady-state transfers per head at a constant level. When r = n, reducing transfers has no impact on the steady-state budget constraint, and the terms OM/O T and 0 C MI T in (10) are zero (i.e., since lifetime consumption and earnings paths stay the same when r = n, steady-state life-cycle wealth, L, will be unaltered by changes in steady-state transfer wealth, T). Thus, any decline in transfer wealth, T, will reduce total wealth, W, dollar for dollar in partial equilibrium when r = n.
In the case that r differs from n, steady-state changes in the level and pattern of transfers (the Tij terms) affect the steady-state budget constraint only insofar as they alter the stock of transfer wealth T. This is a general proposition that can easily be shown to hold independent of the number of periods in the model. When r exceeds n, part of lifetime consumption and leisure is financed by lifetime transfers. Again, under the separability assumption, the reduction in trans-fers has simply an income effect on consumption and leisure and, assuming both are normal goods, will reduce lifetime consumption and raise lifetime earnings. In (10) both OM/49T and OCI/T will be positive when r exceeds n. The reverse will be true when n exceeds r.
It is easy to demonstrate that introducing labor-augmenting productivity growth simply requires relabeling n everywhere as the population growth rate plus the productivity growth rate. In the case of productivity growth, the steady state is characterized by a constant level of transfers per effective worker.
The value of these terms depends on the particular preferences determining the levels and shapes of consumption and leisure paths. Adding 1 Obviously, such detailed individual specific data are not available. However, historical data for the United States on aggregate earnings, aggregate consumption, rates of return, and age-earnings and ageconsumption profiles may be used to carry out this life-cycle asset computation on a cohort-by-cohort basis. This paper treats individuals of each sex within an age cohort as identical and estimates the average excess of after-tax earnings plus government transfers over consumption experienced by members of that age-sex cohort during each of their adult years in the past. These differences are then accumulated up to 1974 using historical net nominal interest rates. The total over all age-sex cohorts of these accumulated life-cycle assets is then compared with the 1974 value of total U.S. private net worth.
Life-cycle wealth of the age-sex cohort that is age a and sex j in In equation (13), Pj (a) stands for the numberof people alive in 1974 who are age a and sexj. The terms Ej (a, i), Gj (a, i), and Cj (a, i) are, respectively, the average after-tax earnings, government transfers, and consumption of the age a-sex j cohort at the time its members were age i. Age 18 is taken as the age of adulthood. Consumption expenditures by adults on children under the age of 18 are considered to be a part of adult consumption rather than intergenerational transfers.1 The term r(a, k) is the economy-wide annual net nominal interest rate received by the age a cohort during the year the cohort's members were k years old.
Our estimate of total life-cycle assets in the economy in 1974 equals the sum over all age-sex cohorts of the estimated values of Lj (a)."2 The difference between life-cycle wealth and total U.S. wealth in 1974 is our estimate of transfer wealth.
Calculation of Longitudinal Profiles of Net Earnings, Government Transfers, and Consumption
The essential idea involved in these calculations is to use crosssectional distribution profiles to allocate aggregate flows of net earnings, government transfers, and consumption to different age-sex cohorts in a given year. By performing this computation for each year from 1900 to 1974, we obtain the longitudinal profiles Ej (a, i), Gj (a, i), and Cj(a, i) as i varies.
To illustrate the computation for Ej (a, i), we define the following terms: et is the average earnings of 40-year-old male workers in year t; gm (a, t) is the ratio of average earnings of male workers at age a in year t to average earnings of 40-year-old male workers in year t; gf(a, t) is the ratio of average earnings of female workers at age a in year t to average earnings of 40-year-old female workers in year t; Xt is the ratio of average earnings of 40-year-old female workers to average earnings of 40-year-old male workers in year t; a.m(a, t) is the percentage of males age a with work experience in year t; af(a, t) is the percentage of females age a with work experience in year t; Ht is total after-tax labor income in year t; Pm (a, t) is the population of males age a in year t; and Pf (a, t) is the population of females age a in year t. Given information on all of the above variables except et, equation (14) , i) = Em[a, a -(1974 -t)] = etgm(a, t)am(a, t) (a, i) = tf[a, a -(1974 -t)] = etXtgf(a, t)af(a, t) .
The procedure for computing the longitudinal profiles of consumption, Cj (a, i), is identical to that just described for earnings; a cross-sectional profile of relative consumption by age and sex is used to distribute aggregate U.S. consumption in each year to different age-sex cohorts.
Calculation of Net Nominal Interest Rates Series
The interest rate term r(a, i) on (13) Values for work experience rates by age and sex, am (a, t) and af (a, t) are available only after 1959. Substantially more information, especially for the early 1900s, is available on labor force participation rates by age and sex. Regression analysis for the post-1959 period indicates that work experience rates can be predicted quite well by functions of age and labor force participation rates. This post-1959 regression was used to estimate the a function for each year from 1900 to 1974 based on labor force participation rates for the appropriate year. The labor force participation rates equal the values predicted from regressions of labor force participation rates on fifth-order age polynomials for each sex and for different census years.
While cross-sectional distribution functions by sex and age were computed for social security and medicare transfers, we assumed that In distributing total household consumption to household members, household heads and their spouses are assumed to consume equally; all other household members, including children, were allocated 50 percent of the household head's consumption. The total consumption of children under the age of 18 was then reallocated to the household head and spouse, assigning each one half of children's consumption in the case of two spouses, or giving all the children's consumption to the household head if he or she was single. The general shape of the profiles was quite insensitive to the assumption that other household members and children consume only 50 percent of the consumption level of the household head. The 50 percent assumption generated slightly more life-cycle wealth and is the one used.
Net nominal interest rate series 1 is generated from data on historical rates of return and Goldsmith and Lipsey's (1963) data on portfolio shares. From Goldsmith and Lipsey's balance sheets we constructed seven asset categories plus liabilities. These are tangible, noncorporate business assets including land and structures, residential land and structures, money, short-term claims (savings accounts and U.S. Treasury bills), corporate stock, long-term corporate bonds, and U.S. savings bonds. A rate of return series was calculated for each asset as well as the liabilities. A weighted rate of return was computed 16 This procedure overestimates accumulated interspousal transfers for three reasons. First, not all transfers of decedents go to surviving spouses or even to surviving relatives in the same age cohort. Second, not all surviving spouses will, themselves, live until age 75. Rather, many will die much earlier, leaving the bulk of their residual wealth to children or grandchildren. Third, some decedents die without ever having married, leaving their estates to younger cohorts. Table 2 Contrary to the life-cycle simulation studies that have generated substantial life-cycle wealth, the actual growth rate of lifetime consumption does not substantially exceed the actual growth rate in lifetime earnings.20 For example, the male age cohort that reached 20 Roger Gordon has suggested to us that observed age-earnings profiles may differ from true age-earnings profiles to the extent that firms and workers are engaged in implicit contractual arrangements. Firms could pay out to workers less (more) than they truly earn when young and more (less) than they truly earn when old. Some part of a worker's life-cycle saving or dissaving would then be accomplished within the firm and would correspond to a claim (or liability) attached to the firm's assets. While we would strongly contest the empirical validity of this proposition, certainly a very upper-bound estimate of life-cycle savings with firms would be the difference between the market and replacement costs of capital in the corporate sector. The LCW2 wealth concept effectively deals with possible bias arising from differential survival probabilities between the rich and the poor. This calculation assumes that at least one member of each household survives to age 75 and attributes all household life-cycle accumulation to the surviving spouse(s). Hence, this procedure assumes that rich and poor households have identical survival probabilities, which eliminates this issue of bias.
Another type of aggregation error could arise if some households continually received higher rates of return on their assets than other households. In order to investigate this issue one would need detailed knowledge of the joint distribution of rates of return and household consumption and earnings patterns. Unfortunately, this information cannot be obtained from existing micro data, and this fact precludes a reasonable assessment of the magnitude of this source of error. (19) Equation (19) is a simplified expression for the steady-state stock of transfers; the formula assumes that all transfers are given at age G and received at age I. The yearly flow of intergenerational transfers is t, the age of death D, and r and n are rates of interest and population plus productivity growth, respectively. In the case r = n, this expression reduces to T = t(G -I), the analogue to equation (9). Table 3 evaluates the age gap factor, that is, the terms multiplying t for various parameter values and taking D to be 55.22 Exactly which age gap is appropriate is unclear.23 An age gap of 30 allows some significant transfers to grandchildren as well as children. The age gap factor in this case for a .01 excess of r over n is 45. Hence, to explain $3,151 billion in transfer wealth, the yearly flow of transfers would have to equal 3,151 divided by 45, or $70 billion. A 2 percent differential between (r -n), again assuming a 30-year gap, would require only a $46 billion annual transfer flow. Unfortunately, before one can precisely determine the total intergenerational flow, substantially more information will have to be collected about family gift giving and support payments to children and grandchildren. These data may prove particularly difficult to obtain since we would have to estimate the value of the cedar chest passed from grandmother to grandnephew, or the family car given to son John as a college graduation present, or the value to son Alex of making him a full partner in a lucrative family business. Since the distribution of wealth is very highly skewed, such surveys need to be aimed at the intergenerational transfer payments of the very wealthy. However, the very wealthy may be the least willing to disclose these types of transfers because of potential estate and gift tax liabilities.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper rules out life-cycle hump saving as the major determinant of capital accumulation in the U.S. economy. Longitudinal age-earnings and age-consumption profiles do not exhibit the kinds of shapes needed to generate a large amount of life-cycle wealth accumulation. The view of U.S. capital formation as arising, in the main, from essentially homogeneous individuals or married spouses saving when young for their retirement is factually incorrect.
Intergenerational transfers appear to be the major element determining wealth accumulation in the United States. Our best estimates of the 1974 stock of transfer wealth after allowing for interspousal life-cycle accumulation is approximately $3 trillion.
While these estimates of the stock of transfer wealth are quite large, totally eliminating transfers in the U.S. economy would not necessarily reduce total U.S. wealth by the full amount of transfer wealth. We have demonstrated within the context of a steady-state growth model that a $1.00 reduction in the stock of transfer wealth may reduce total wealth by less than $1.00 if the steady-state real interest rate exceeds the steady-state growth rate. Taking the U.S. historical real interest and growth rates as illustrative, eliminating a $3 trillion stock of transfer wealth would reduce total U.S. wealth by about $2.1 trillion in a steady-state context. This, however, is a partial equilibrium analysis. Substantially more research must be undertaken before we can begin to attach probable numbers to full general equilibrium responses to changes in transfers. This paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially more research and data collection on intergenerational transfers. Economic models of savings that stress the homogeneity of agents and the importance of the demographic structure should give way to models that emphasize the rather massive intergenerational transfers in the U.S. economy and the apparent concentration of these transfers among the very wealthy.
